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Change
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Abstract The title of this chapter refers to how current developments in technology 
are not just one further innovation of the industrial era, but will lead to decisive 
changes in production methods, markets, labour, consumption and, to a consider-
able extent, personal and social relationships. But these changes will be happening 
within the economic and political framework of the period prior to digitalisation and 
will persist in the globalisation of the economy. These pages will focus on what we 
believe to be key issues: changes to business and work, changes to the education and 
training of people in general and the active population in particular, and certain 
activities that will have a profound effect on the way we communicate and relate to 
each other.
No technological innovation, not even this one, exists and acts in isolation from 
the socio-political framework. Therefore, it is also important to analyse the policies 
and strategies that might lead the digital economy in one direction or another, 
towards an increase in inequality or in welfare. Going further, what our analysis 
does not cover is how the digital revolution could be of great help to curb the climate 
crisis, with changes in energy production, mobility, construction and protection of 
the environment, provided there is political will and consequent action.
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5.1  Introduction: The Role of the Digital Economy 
and Policies to Universalise Its Positive Effects
The digital economy, together with the digital revolution (the so-called fourth tech-
nological revolution), is here to stay. It is a process that began several decades ago 
and that shall continue for many more. This economy will coexist alongside the 
traditional economy, although the former will use increasingly more digital instru-
ments. This has been the case with all technological changes ever since the first 
industrial revolution. By ‘digital economy’ we mean that which is mainly based on 
such instruments as the internet, robotics, big data and artificial intelligence, and 
which partly dematerialise the economy and partly base the production of goods 
and services on these digital skills and tools. It is so strong that to a greater or lesser 
degree it will eventually permeate most economic activities and many other aspects 
of everyday life.
Some research (Frey and Osborne 2013) has raised alarms by pointing out that in 
many countries more than 40% of jobs are at a high risk of disappearing in a few 
years due to the emergence of the digital revolution. A few years later, other studies 
(Arntz et al. 2016) reduced this destruction, for OECD countries, to percentages of 
no more than 12%. The differences have to do with the methodology used: the for-
mer analyse the basic tasks of professions while the latter refer to the basic tasks of 
jobs, which leads to the assumption that digital technologies transform jobs by 
replacing certain tasks with others. From further research (Deloitte 2015) it can be 
deduced that new fields are appearing in human activity and everyday life that are 
giving rise to new jobs and new occupations, mainly in the broad services sector. All 
of these will be affected to some degree by digitalisation, and it is difficult to make 
any accurate predictions in this respect.
The digital economy will have a major impact on business organisation and 
employment: it will eliminate some jobs and create others, and to a varying extent 
all kinds of jobs will be affected in some way. The conditions will not necessarily 
be better, and they may become worse. The reason is that technological innovation 
occurs, as it always has done, in a specific context of social-labour relations that 
may be more or less regulated, and which is both national and global. This condi-
tioning of social relations is what leads us to believe that social and political action 
can somehow guide the technological revolution to ensure that it is beneficial, 
because it is not a blind force. However, globalisation will make socio-political 
intervention more complex at the level of each country. The digital revolution will 
also influence everyday life (leisure, consumption, lifestyle, education and training, 
mobility, homes), of course again not mechanically, but in a way that can be gov-
erned, if people are properly prepared, to ensure that it contributes to better rather 
than impoverished lives. This chapter therefore pursues two goals: to evaluate how, 
hypothetically, this economy, basically in the fields of employment and everyday 
life, will evolve in the ten countries of Europe and Latin America that we compare, 
and what political and social instruments can influence said evolution to ensure that 
welfare becomes more widespread.
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Society and politics can influence the digital economy in two ways: on the one 
hand, by deciding on the use and distribution of the financial surplus generated by 
technological change and on the other by improving the labour market, both in 
terms of demand (companies and administrations) and offer (workers and people) 
and improving living conditions. In the former case, there is need to design tax 
reforms and welfare policies to redistribute the surplus and for administration to 
play a key role in modernising the country’s productive structure: technology, 
energy, stimulation of small and medium enterprises, and the blurring of regional 
differences and digital divides (by gender, age, class and region). In the latter case, 
people need to be prepared for work and for life, with a different kind of education 
both initially and also in terms of lifelong training. Also with regard to  the offer, 
issues that need to be addressed include working hours (reducing them if the general 
system is more productive), structural unemployment, which will be high, the guar-
antee of workers’ rights, and the possibility of representation for workers in digital- 
based companies and administrations that will be organised in radically different 
ways. Digitisation will influence many other aspects of everyday life and social 
relationships, and society will therefore need to work hard to prevent exclusion.
One characteristic of the digital revolution, with respect to the past, is that asyn-
chrony will increase, as it has done in previous revolutions. This refers to the differ-
ing rates at which the supply of and demand for work evolve, due to people living 
longer lives and the stage of those lives also being prolonged; on the one hand, 
schooling and training prior to or during access to employment, independence from 
the family, reproduction and care for dependent persons, active presence in the 
labour market, other life experiences; on the other, the speed of the changes that 
condition the demand for work (technologies, globalisation, organisation of produc-
tion). In other words: the speed at which labour is reproduced is much slower than 
the changes to production and the distribution of goods and services (Vinokur 1998).
5.2  Methodology: Advantages and Limitations 
of a Comparison Between Countries
What we intend to do in this text is to address the issue of the digital revolution and 
socio-cultural change in a comparative manner between European and Latin 
American countries involved in the INCASI project, five from each continent (in 
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay and in Europe: Spain, 
Finland, France, Italy and the United Kingdom). And from three angles of observa-
tion: (a) business, employment and everyday life, (b) the relationship between edu-
cation and work and (c) consumption and social relations.
To do this we propose a dual strategy. On the one hand, to avoid speculative 
views of the future, we shall begin from the changes affecting the future that began 
years ago and are still happening today, for which we shall have to identify, for each 
of the topics, those aspects that we have already lived and that we know about, and 
that we believe foretell what might happen in the future, considering that the digital 
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revolution already began several years ago, but could get faster in the near future. 
On the other hand, the comparative nature of the text will require identification of 
the indicators of those anticipatory behaviours and events that we discussed in the 
previous section and that are available in a comparable manner. To do this, we must 
turn to publications of these indicators by international organisations where, albeit 
partially, European and Latin American countries are represented, i.e. OECD and 
ILO publications. The advantage of a comparative approach is that we are speaking 
of the countries involved in the INCASI project and aiming to capture their hetero-
geneity, while the main challenge is to reduce that heterogeneity to a small number 
of quantitative indicators for which, moreover, in some cases, we have no recent 
statistical information with which to compare.
Our goal is modest. We merely seek to collect some indicators on the set of coun-
tries considered. These indicators should allow us to make some progress with com-
parison of the digital revolution and socio-cultural change in different countries. In 
short, the work we present in this text has been conducted in three stages: (1) 
Identification of the phenomena that foresee future changes in the digital revolution 
and social change in the three aforesaid areas, (2) definition of the indicators we can 
use for comparison between countries and identification of the sources that could 
provide information on them and (3) a comparative assessment based on the afore-
said that can offer clues as to the diversity of processes in different countries, even 
though the comparison is based on a limited sample.
5.3  Changes to Businesses, Employment and Everyday Life
5.3.1  In Businesses and Employment
Faced with the challenge of the digital revolution, Spain obtains good results for 
internet connection and electronic administration, although with territorial differ-
ences, particularly between urban and rural area, with regard to the formers. But the 
country’s position is weak in terms of qualified human capital in digital skills and in 
the use of digital technologies by small and medium enterprises, particularly in 
purchases and sales (Índice de Economía y Sociedad Digital -DESI- 2018; Ministerio 
de Industria, Energía y Turismo 2017; Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones 
Públicas 2016). Nor do small and medium-sized companies perform particularly 
well for training in ICT skills, which shows that they do not use them much in their 
activity. Here lies the great problem and the great challenge for the future, because 
these amount to more than 95% of the companies in the country, meaning that Spain 
appears weakly equipped to face the challenges of the digital revolution. Other EU 
countries that we analyse, like Finland and the United Kingdom, are in a better posi-
tion, while Italy is in a worse situation and France is in a similar one. We do not have 
similar indicators for Latin American countries, although those used in Sect. 3.2 
lead us to assume that these countries, perhaps with the exception of Chile in some 
aspects, are more poorly positioned than European countries.
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This must be taken into account to understand the changes that are taking place 
in companies, partly as a result of technological innovation, partly due to changes in 
organisational methods. It is leading to smaller production and service centres, 
although large companies continue to increase in size, and to some extent there is a 
blurring of formerly clear boundaries between sectors and subsectors, leading to 
multi-sector companies. But, as far as employment is concerned, digitalisation is 
giving rise to two types of transformation (Lopez Sintas et al. 2018). The first is that 
routine jobs are replaceable by robots, which can work alone or do so in the com-
pany of humans. This routinisation is advancing from manual tasks to more intel-
lectual ones. Lladós (2018) presents highly illustrative data in this regard, comparing 
Spain with the EU average to show how the former exceeds the European average 
in manual tasks and personal care and services, as well as in routine work, but is 
below average in intellectual, educational and coordination tasks, as well as in ICT, 
which represents a risk for medium-term employment. Latin American countries 
may well be closer to Spain than the European average, but we do not have compa-
rable data. The second refers to the organisation of labour, i.e. the coordination of 
the work done within the company, and relations with suppliers and customers, who 
are being partly replaced by digital platforms, which in turn outsource to smaller 
companies, examples being Uber, Amazon, Glovo, Deliveroo and Airb&b. This is 
happening both in the European Union and in the global economy, although the dif-
ferences have a lot to do with the technological might and strategies of small and 
medium enterprises in each country. The presented changes can influence employ-
ment in the ways mentioned in the introduction, i.e. destruction, creation and trans-
formation, but there are notable differences by country, mainly related to the 
productive structure: if it is less technological, there may be a greater risk of human 
labour being replaced by robots or connections to online systems. But at the same 
time, we also need to take into account the strategies employed by companies, since 
in certain cases (e.g. Spain and Latin American countries), the low wages and high 
flexibility of labour (heightened in Latin America by informal work) in comparison 
to many other European countries may mean that robotisation is not profitable, at 
least not for the time being.
The risk of job loss, measured by various indicators (Table 5.1), differs among 
the countries that we are comparing because the digital revolution is advancing at 
different rates, although all of them are conditioned by their position in the global 
economy, since they are not only competing with technology, but also with other 
labour costs, tax regimes and other factors.
Only the last available year has been used in order to eliminate, as much as pos-
sible, the effect of the economic crisis on EU countries, since almost all of them (the 
exception is unemployment in Spain) are returning to the 2008 rates. However, two 
conclusions can be drawn from these indicators: that poor quality jobs (underem-
ployment, informal employment) are the norm in many countries, with or without 
digitalisation, although the latter is much more frequent in Latin American coun-
tries; and that the risk of loss of the most routine jobs (unemployment, which is 
higher among people who perform low-skilled tasks and, in part, underemploy-
ment) is high in all Latin American countries, Spain and Italy, probably due to their 
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productive structure as well as their subordinate position in the globalisation pro-
cess, which increases the risk of routinisation. However, poor employment and 
unemployment are sources of low salary costs, and therefore entail a lower risk of 
effective robotisation.
Beyond the experts’ predictions about the risk of job loss, we have a relative 
indicator of the possible risk, namely the number of robots (Table 5.2) in the differ-
ent countries, and therefore of effective robotisation entailing the loss of real jobs.
The manufacturing industry, and in particular the automobile industry, represents 
only a small number of the jobs in most countries, which explains why the figures 
for Germany and South Korea (630 robots/10,000 workers) are so high in that sub-
sector. The low number of robots in the UK is particularly striking, probably due to 
its decline in vehicle manufacturing. In Latin American countries, robotisation is 
Table 5.1 Risk variables of job loss or precariousness, 2018
Under-employed people
Unemployment rate
Informal employmentaTotal Men Women
Uruguay 20.4 8.0 6.5 9.7 Uruguay*** 33.2
Chile 21.7 7.2 6.8 7.9 Chile*** 28.3
Mexico 11.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 Mexico*** 52.2
Argentina 19.2 9.5 8.5 10.8 Argentina*** 48.1
Brazil 24.3 12.5 11.1 14.4 Brazil*** 37.5
Spain 24.8 15.5 13.6 17.6 Latin America & 
Caribbean**
49.0
Italy 22.8 10.2 11.1 14.4
France 19.5 9.2 9.1 9.2
UK 11.5 4.0 4.0 3.9 European Union ** 13.2
Finland 18.2 7.8 7.9 7.6
Under-employed: working part-time or, working full-time, would like to increase their work-
ing hours
Sources: Unemployment rate, ILOSTAT (2018). Informal employment: ** Philipe Mercadent. The 
transition of the informal economy through an integrated approach, V Seminar on informal econ-
omy (data relative to 2016), Sept. 2017, ILO; *** ILOSTAT: (non-agricultural population) Chile 
2017, Mexico 2017, Argentina 2018, Brazil 2013, Uruguay 2013
aRecent studies measure informal or submerged employment, in terms of GDP, not of employment. 
See the publications of Leandro Medina and Friedrich Schneider (2017), Shadow economies all 
over the world: new estimates for 162 countries from 1999–2007 Leandro Medina and Friedrich 
Schneider (2017). Shadow Economies Around the World: What Did We Learn Over the Last 
20 Years? (special reference to European countries), IMF Working Papers, n° 18, 2017
Table 5.2 Robots per 10,000 employees in the manufacturing industry (2016)
Italy 185 Mexico 31
Spain 160 Argentina 18
Finland 138 Brazil 10
France 132 Germany 309
UK 71 South Korea 631
Source: International Federation of Robotics (2017)
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probably less profitable for the time being due to the low wage costs. We should also 
note that in countries like the UK and Finland, digitalisation is transforming jobs, 
especially in services, where robotisation is making fewer inroads. Another aspect 
to consider is digital platforms, which destroy stable employment inside and create 
unstable employment outside (in the same city, the same country or in another), so- 
called ‘independent workers’. There is very little data on the topic. According to 
Cañigueral (2019), the number of professionals working independently in such 
companies has grown in Europe by 45% since 2005. In Spain, the growth is even 
greater, 51%.
Digitisation can improve certain jobs and make others worse. Among the latter 
we have ‘riders’, but this can also be the case of many other ‘independent workers’ 
who work for low pay due to the strong competition, which in some professions can 
be global, and perform a variety of different tasks, particularly in services and work-
ing remotely. However, employment in the ICT sector tends to be a solid indicator 
of job improvement in countries where the digital economy is making advances. 
According to recent OECD data, employment in the ICT sector in 2015 was 3% for 
all OECD countries, 1.8 in Spain and 0.5 in Mexico. Argentina and Chile are below 
that figure, the UK is above it (OCDE 2015). The qualification requirements for 
such work will increase in the coming years (CEDEFOP 2015), although they will 
not always lead to quality jobs (salary, contract, hours) as was verified by a recent 
study in Spain (Alós 2019).
Many of the publications on employment in the digital revolution highlight the 
impending loss of current jobs, but they under-emphasise the creation of new jobs 
and the transformation of others. In any case, it is not enough to only refer to the 
possible future. We must also take into account what is already happening, because 
we are already in the digital revolution that destroys, creates and transforms jobs. 
We shall examine the evolution of employment in the last 15–20  years in three 
countries: the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain. Between 2000 and 
2015, the United Kingdom (Deloitte 2015) gained more than two million jobs, with 
a decrease in low-skilled and a large increase in skilled ones, particularly in ser-
vices. The United States (McKinsey 2019) is at all-time record employment levels. 
Jobs are particularly more numerous in education, health, trade, personal services 
and entertainment. Spain (Encuesta de Población Activa) created three million jobs 
between 2000 and 2007, lost four million with the crisis and since 2014 has regained 
three million. But these jobs are mainly being created in traditional sectors such as 
low-skilled services and construction, with little technological potential. It is in 
terms of productive structure that the three countries differ, and this is where mod-
ernisation needs to happen.
Poor jobs and unemployment will continue to be the real threats, even if robotisa-
tion is halted. The former may not disappear with digitalisation,1 because competi-
tiveness has become more and more global. Regarding the latter, there is a risk that 
1 Spain is the EU country with the most workers on digital platforms (Pablo G. Bejerano, El Pais 
29 August 2019), mostly in highly unstable working conditions.
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it will be high in periods of transition, but it could then drop due to the creation of 
so many jobs linked to education, health and social services, environmental care, 
leisure and culture. So, today, in developed countries, low wages would seem to be 
a greater threat than unemployment in the near future. We should also note that the 
requirements for qualified employment are not exclusively linked to ICT 
(Information and Communication Technologies) companies and high level digital 
skills. It could also be required in services like education, health, social services and 
other services that will clearly need a basic level of digital skills, but that will be 
substantially based on other ones (Alós 2019).
5.3.2  Everyday Life and Technologies (Internet, Mobile 
Phones, Digital Networks)
An analysis of the advance of information and communication technologies 
(hereinafter ICT) in the public arena means examining the effect on the modes of 
production that they have enabled, their consumption by people and households, 
and how they have affected their daily lives. This section will address the major 
social changes brought about by the digital and technological transformations that 
have occurred in the world by examining the penetration of internet, mobile tele-
phones and social networks to verify the use or consumption of technologies by 
individuals and households, confirming the rapid, dynamic and large-scale disper-
sion of these in the countries analysed.
In the early 2000s, the development of digital technologies led to the techno-
logical convergence of the internet, smartphones and the emerging social net-
works (Rainie and Wellman 2012). To avoid semantic confusion, this chapter 
refers to the latter as ‘digital networks’ rather than ‘social networks’ as they are 
commonly known. The aforesaid technologies have produced countless changes 
to the lives of the people who carry them and to the homes that use them, as is so 
evident today.
The convergence of these technologies has meant that a sizeable proportion of 
interpersonal communication is now conducted via digital media due to the 
decreased restrictions in terms of time and space and an increase in interactivity 
(Wolton 2000). This means people can be in permanent communication due to the 
reduction of barriers to interpersonal communication in terms of both time and 
space, and this communication is both instantaneous and asynchronous.
The result was not only technological but also socio-technological, due to the 
mass adoption of technologies in relatively short periods that were designed for 
people to be able to access in everyday contexts. The internet has provided people 
with a greater capacity to communicate and access information because it has 
increased their ability to connect with other people and groups. Smartphones have 
given them the possibility of permanent communication, whereby they can access 
the information they need and make contact with people and groups of interest. 
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Via the digital network, which is basically a web-based service in which people can 
create a public or semi-public profile within a delimited system, they can also 
create lists of other users with whom they wish to share a connection, browse that 
list of connections, and see what other users are doing within the system (Boyd and 
Ellison 2007). Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, Flickr, Tumblr and many 
other digital networks have provided people with a simple way to manage social ties 
and to move among larger and less compact groups, with access to a greater diver-
sity of social relationships (Rainie and Wellman 2012). The data in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4 shows how people adopted all three technologies in particular countries.
The internet spread rapidly in a relatively short time in all countries. Although it did 
not cover the entire population, the proportion of the population that had the service 
grew a little more than twofold in Finland and Italy, and grew fivefold in Brazil.
Mobile telephones underwent significant growth in the period. For all countries 
analysed, except Mexico, the entire population had coverage by 2010, and the 
Table 5.3 Percentage of individuals using the internet in the following countries, 2000–2015
Countries 2000 2005 2010 2015
Argentina 7.04 17.72 45.00 68.04
Brazil 2.87 21.02 40.65 58.33
Chile 16.60 31.18 45.00 76.63
Mexico 5.08 17.21 31.05 57.43
Uruguay 10.54 20.09 46.40 64.60
France 14.31 42.87 77.28 78.01
Finland 37.25 74.48 86.89 86.42
Spain 13.62 47.88 65.80 78.69
Italy 23.11 35.00 53.68 58.14
United Kingdom 26.82 70.00 85.00 92.00
Source: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
Table 5.4 Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2000–2015
Countries 2000 2005 2010 2015
Argentina 17.51 56.60 138.47 142.43
Brazil 13.23 46.12 100.07 125.18
Chile 22.29 65.46 116.82 130.65
Mexico 13.84 43.45 77.89 85.54
Uruguay 12.37 34.73 131.49 150.53
France 48.74 78.53 91.68 103.45
Finland 71.87 100.21 156.36 134.92
Spain 59.32 96.94 109.83 110.07
Italy 73.74 121.58 156.82 147.37
United Kingdom 73.71 108.60 121.20 121.18
Source: https://www.itu.int/en/IU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
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uptake continued to rise through to 2015. The significant penetration of mobile 
phones2 fully expresses the relentless expansion of digital technology, while leap-
frogging meant that not only was the technology attracting new users, but many who 
had never had landlines directly became mobile telephone users.
The evolution of digital networks in the analysed countries, as shown in Fig. 5.1, 
describes the presence of Facebook in the 2008–2019 period and Twitter between 
2009 and 2019. The methodology used to capture data for the period is Google 
Trends, and we show the number of mentions of Facebook and Twitter in the search 
engine. The data in the tables is normalised to 100%, so the maximum value is one 
hundred, and the remaining values are adjusted proportionally.
The data on digital networks shows how Facebook emerged from 2008 and 
Twitter from 2009. The Facebook digital network was adopted in a similar way in all 
analysed countries. The cycle began with constant growth users until reaching a max-
imum proportion that at times exceeded 90% in some countries. In Chile, it is noted 
that the penetration began in March 2008, once the network had been made public 
and open all around the world that year. The characteristics of the development strat-
egy allowed the import of technological goods with low tariffs, so a large number of 
digital items for personal use were made available for consumption by the popula-
tion. Acquiring them meant having access to modern goods, which are consumed in 
advanced countries (Mayol and Ahumada 2014).3 In Brazil, Facebook was incorpo-
rated in 2010, for that country had a very similar digital network of its own called 
Orkut4 that was widely used, being replaced by Facebook in 2010 and 2011.
Twitter appeared in 2006. Its trajectory was similar to that of Facebook, but in 
much smaller proportions. In just a few years, it expanded rapidly to reach a maxi-
mum number of users, around 5% in Latin American countries, and between 10% 
and 12% in the set of European countries analysed.
In summary, the data shows that the process of adoption of the analysed digital 
technologies was relentless rather than gradual, involving a constant convergence of 
technologies, with specific differences between countries in the period. Digital net-
works appeared in waves and users were able to access a number of them and use 
them in complementary manners. In 1997, they arrived in people’s everyday lives 
around the world when Six Degrees appeared on the internet. The following decade 
brought Fotolog in 2002; Linkedin and MySpace in 2003, Flickr in 2004, YouTube 
in 2005, and Twitter in 2006 (Boyd and Ellison 2007), all available on users’ mobile 
phones. So, by 2010 the convergence of the aforesaid technologies had been 
consolidated, and they were part of people’s everyday lives. Later in this chapter, we 
shall look in depth at the social consequences of these changes.
2 Regarding mobile telephones, the 2018 Latinobarómetro report (p. 76) noted that “the possession 
of cell phones and Smartphones has broken the digital divide by delivering access to social 
networks”.
3 In Mayol and Ahumada (2014).
4 This network existed between January 2004 and 30 September 2014.
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5.4  Society’s Possible Response to the Fourth 
Technological Revolution
5.4.1  What Policies and Regulations Are Desirable in Relation 
to Employment?
The answer to the challenges of the digital revolution must come from companies 
and society as a whole; the former by creating adequate and quality jobs, the latter 
through political interventions and changes in lifestyles both in relation to the pro-
ductive system and with respect to people’s education, as well as reforms and regu-
lations that continue to guarantee rights and achieve the inclusion of those at risk of 
exclusion. Two types of intervention are needed: those that can be carried out by 
administrations and those that come from the relationships between actors in the 
labour market (social dialogue, negotiation). Several kinds of action are required of 
administration: support for the modernisation of the productive structure by invest-
ing more in R&D&I, support for the digitalisation of small and medium enterprises, 
increasing energy transformation, promoting economic sectors with a future, and so 
on, all of which would help to create more skilled jobs. Public policies can also 
improve the quantity and quality of essential public services, whereby jobs would 
also be of better quality. It is also essential to invest in education and training and 
bring it more in line with the digital era.
Investment in R&D&I (Table 5.5) is essential in order to modernise the pro-
ductive structure, adapting it to the new parameters of the digital revolution. The 
European Union stated in 2010 that it is crucial for investment in this area to 
reach 3% of GDP by 2020, when summing public and private investment. 2017 
data shows (European Commission 2018) that the average such investment in the 
European Union is only slightly over 2%, with only Germany, Denmark and 
Sweden having reached 3%. Spain is still far behind, and has fallen back during 
the crisis period, and that is not a good sign. The Commission feels that one 
instrument to achieve this goal is the doubling of public investment, something 
that Spain has not done either. The compared Latin American countries, with the 
exception of Brazil, are far from that recommended percentage, and this will 
undoubtedly hinder the transformation of their productive and employment 
structures even more than in Spain (Table 5.5). Public policies are another key 
Table 5.5 Investment in R&D&I/GDP in the countries studied (2017)
Uruguay 0.41 Spain 1.21
Chile 0.36 Italy 1.35
Mexico 0.49 France 2.25
Argentina 0.53 UK 1.79
Brazil 1.27 Finland 2.76
Sources: Europe EUROSTAT 2019, World Bank 2017 Eurostat updated March 2019: EU. World 
Bank: Mexico (2017), Argentina (2016), Chile (2016), Brazil (2016), Uruguay (2016)
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factor in these countries. The State can play a clear role in this drive towards a new 
economy (Mazzucato 2015), with stronger action, especially with regard to small 
and medium enterprises (Miguélez et al. 2019).
Another aspect of capital importance, in terms of productive structure, is the 
change of energy model, which is shifting quickly from fossil and nuclear energy to 
renewable energy. This is essential in the face of an even greater challenge than that 
of technology, the climate crisis, and this is an issue that digital technology itself 
could actually help to prevent. There are notable differences between countries in 
terms of the use of renewable energies, as can be deduced from the data for 2015 in 
the following Table 5.6 (World Bank 2016). More Latin American countries than 
Europeans, except Finland, are close to reaching a level at which alternative energy 
is more widespread than fossil and nuclear forms. This could be an advantage for 
the former and should be an incentive for the latter.
The proportion of employed managers, professionals and technicians in a coun-
try may be an approximate indicator of job quality in the upper primary segment, 
derived from both a technologically consistent productive structure that is open to 
digitalisation and quality public services (Table 5.7). Once again, the data suggests 
differences in quality between the countries of the European Union, led by the 
Table 5.6 Renewable energy consumption/total, 2015
France 13.50 Argentina 10.04
Italy 16.52 Brazil 43.80
Spain 16.25 Mexico 9.22
United Kingdom 8.71 Uruguay 58.02
Finland 43.24 Chile 24.88
Source: World Bank (2016)
Table 5.7 High educational levels and quality of employment
Employed with advanced 
educational level 2018 Percentage
Employed with advanced 
educational level 2018 Percentage
Uruguay 12.5 Spain 42.9
Chile 18.7 Italy 21.7
Mexico 23.42 France 40.7
Argentina 22.56 UK 43.7
Brazil 21.90 Finland 44.0
Employed: Managers, 
Professionals, Technicians 2018 Percentage
Employed: Managers, 
Professionals, Technicians 2018 Percentage
Uruguay 22.4 Spain 33.9
Chile 26.2 Italy 36.8
Mexico 19.8 France 45.9
Argentina (2017) 24.7 UK 49.0
Brazil 23.8 Finland 47.9
Source: ILOSTAT (2018)
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United Kingdom, and Latin America, where Chile is slightly above the rest. Spain 
and Italy are in intermediate position between the two continents. There is also a 
highly notable difference between the countries of both continents as a whole for 
the higher education indicator, with Uruguay in a particularly weak position. Italy is 
on a similar level to Latin America. There is a notable deficit in education in these 
countries in the face of the challenges of the digital revolution. However, the high 
educational level of Spain, where universities have boomed in the last two decades, 
has not led to a higher percentage of quality jobs than the European Union average, 
due to a more traditional productive structure and an abundance of low-skilled and 
poorly paid jobs in public services (Alós 2019; Banyuls and Recio 2012). This is 
another indication that technological innovation and high education levels depend 
on the socio-economic context and government policies.
It is worth asking whether administrations are obliged to implement new regula-
tions to deal with the appearance of many jobs that lack guarantees in terms of 
hours, contracts, pay and bargaining, an area where social dialogue and bargaining 
can complement the ways in which problems are tackled and resolved. Although 
there has been little empirical research in this regard, there was a recent study in 
Spain (Miguélez et  al. 2019), in which experts and social actors almost unani-
mously defend the need to regulate these new types of job, often held by ‘indepen-
dent workers’ (digital nomadism, whereby people can use computers to work from 
anywhere in the world; on-call, with no set number of hours or wages; collective 
work, crowdworking). Two different kinds of proposal are suggested, namely 
social dialogue and modification by Parliament of the Workers’ Statute. Not only 
trade unionists, but also most experts and most significantly business owners, are 
in favour of new ‘independent workers’ continuing to have the right to negotiate 
their working conditions.
The new economy will pose other challenges, in which policies must play a role, 
such as the possibility of reducing the working day that, apart from social and per-
sonal benefits, could have a positive influence on the economy by increasing the 
time that people have for engaging in other activities, such as culture, leisure, learn-
ing new skills, and so on, which would boost employment. It is also likely that the 
pace of technological change will increase structural unemployment. Dealing with 
this may require, as many experts believe and as many experiences are showing, the 
guarantee of a minimum income to certain groups, and this income could be uncon-
ditional or conditional to training or activities useful to the community. The latter 
was especially predominant in the answers to the questionnaire used in the aforesaid 
study (Miguélez et al. 2019).
All these policies will ultimately need funding, which will mean reviewing tax 
systems. Should robots pay taxes on the profits generated by digitalisation, and on 
the profits generated by multinational companies in any country in which they are 
present and not only where they are registered for tax purposes, which may be a 
semi-tax haven? Traditional tax systems are mostly based on the income of people 
employed in the country and the profits of companies based in the same. The digital 
economy could change this framework, and political debate can be expected to shift 
in the direction of certain changes that have already been made by the European 
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Parliament, albeit without, for now, the Commission’s proposed taxation on robots 
having achieved its objective. There is also on-going debate on the issue of green 
taxes, which are essential in order to halt the climate crisis.
5.4.2  A New Concept of School and Education Is Required
The asynchrony of people living longer and the rapid technological and social 
changes described in the introduction to this text already requires today, and will do 
even more in the future, a new kind of school and education system. In order to deal 
with the changes in the relationship between education and work that this asyn-
chrony entails, we need to create a new concept of schooling and training, along 
with changes to the functions and organisation of the institutions that support it. 
There are two main changes: (a) the concept of education as a lifelong process and 
(b) a focus on “initial schooling”  to lay the foundations and provide the instruments 
in an irreversible manner to ensure that lifelong education is viable for all.
One of the first phenomena that require attention is that in order to keep up with 
the many changes to work and life that people are going to encounter throughout 
their lives, education must be viewed as a life-long process. This will be a complex 
process and the result of non-linear educational experiences, with people entering 
and leaving School, or learning while working, and doing so flexibly throughout 
their whole lives. Within this complex process, digital technologies will play a 
greater role as ways to learn and will penetrate the other forms of education based 
on virtual learning, such as MOOC (Massive Online Open Courses). Both the face- 
to- face and strictly virtual forms of schooling will be fully affected by technological 
change and will generate ‘micro-learning’ supported by internet access and the edu-
cational use of that access.
Both the speed of the change in what we must learn and of the way we will learn 
it will imply that, in terms of management, both school and other forms of education 
will need to forego the pretension of ‘anticipating’ what the labour market is going 
to require in the medium and long term, as we have been trying to do so very inef-
fectively for decades (Planas 2014). Given the uncertainty of the precise require-
ments of the labour market, we must flexibly manage school and training systems 
by combining a solid initial education with refresher mechanisms to meet whatever 
labour demands might arise in the future, throughout people’s active lives. We are 
faced by the phenomenon of ‘myopia’, the farther ahead we look to understand the 
requirements of the labour market, the hazier our view becomes. And to continue 
with the analogy, because of the speed of technological change we will need increas-
ingly more powerful diopters and we simply do not seem to have strong enough 
lenses for the purpose. This phenomenon of ‘myopia’ means we can only anticipate 
the needs of the labour market in the short term or, at most, in some fields, in the 
medium term.
As Hampt and Woessmann (2017) note, based on the results of the PIAAC sur-
vey, education focused on specialisation to meet the demands of a given time is 
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“bread for today, but hunger for tomorrow.” In the abstract to their paper they write: 
“It has been argued that vocational education facilitates the school-to-work transi-
tion but reduces later adaptability to changing environments. Using the recent inter-
national PIAAC data, we confirm such a trade-off over the life-cycle in a 
difference-in-differences model that compares employment rates across education 
type and age. An initial employment advantage of individuals with vocational com-
pared to general education turns into a disadvantage later in life. Results are stron-
gest in apprenticeship countries that provide the highest intensity of industry-based 
vocational education”.
Given this phenomenon, we must distinguish between two types of learning: 
basic, which is preferably acquired in the early stage of people’s lives (childhood and 
youth) and in which, at least until today, general schooling has played a decisive role, 
and continuous training, which is based on that basic education. The main goal of the 
former is the long-term objective of learning the basics, the skills and the knowledge 
that will serve us to learn the new skills and knowledge that the technological and 
social change will require of us in the short term, throughout our adult lives. These 
changes will also require the school system to allow people to come in and out of 
school during their active lives, with their school learning overlapping or coinciding 
with other jobs, or while exercising domestic and care duties. This will imply that 
schools, especially at their higher levels, will need to make their institutional struc-
tures more flexible to allow for this (Conseil National du Numérique 2016).
Today, neither schools nor companies, nor the ways in which reproductive tasks 
are organised, are flexible enough for such an approach to be viable for people. 
School and training itineraries are too complex. Very few countries have addressed 
this issue in their legislation, even fewer schools allow for it and although numbers 
are growing, few companies encourage it.
Regarding the kinds, contents and functions of education, the current panorama 
is characterised by the need to understand that education is, already today, but even 
more so tomorrow, the result of the co-production of a multitude of educational 
spaces in a wide variety of moments in people’s lives: school (of various types, 
including virtual schools), work (paid and unpaid), the many spaces of non-formal 
education, internet ... And in combinations that cannot, a priori, be predicted or 
standardised.
With the experience of recent decades one thing seems clear, the capacity to 
access lifelong education depends largely on the education (of all kinds) received 
during the compulsory education period. Lifelong learning was sometimes viewed 
as a way to make up for deficits in initial education and to compensate for the 
inequalities in early schooling, but the reality today very clearly shows that the phe-
nomenon actually works the other way round. The people who most access lifelong 
education are those who had more and better initial education. So rather than com-
pensating for differences in initial education, lifelong learning increases them, as 
the people who more easily and more frequently access it are those that received 
more and better initial education.
It also seems reasonable to imagine that, as occurred with the surplus of previous 
technological revolutions that was used, among other things, to develop and 
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implement compulsory schooling for everyone, a large part of the economic surplus 
that is generated and will be generated by technological change should be used to 
sustain early education and lifelong learning policies. That is provided there is the 
political will to do so, as there was when implementing education for all in the last 
century.
Getting early schooling and education to really be a sufficient starting point to 
guarantee lifelong learning is a priority challenge today if we are to prevent deficits 
in the former from leading to social exclusion.
Responsibility for this new type of lifelong schooling will require the intervention 
of many actors, at least, the State, in its multiple forms and levels, companies, families 
and individuals. There are three basic questions that must be answered in order to 
organise the different kinds of lifelong learning: Who decides the purpose of educa-
tion other than that in the initial stage? Who pays? Who puts in the time? Policies and 
the available public resources will have to help find the answers to these questions.
As for who decides the purpose of additional learning, there are clearly three key 
decision makers: (a) companies according to their needs, (b) people who need to 
refresh their knowledge, or refocus their careers by changing companies or even 
sectors and (c) the state to support its policies of all kinds.
The experience of recent decades tells us that whoever decides on the training 
that workers need (the actual worker, his/her company or the State) will influence 
(albeit not decisively) the answer to the other two questions: Who pays? Who puts 
in the time?
As a general trend, we might suppose that whoever decides would have greater 
responsibility for assuming the costs, both of the education and of the time. But in 
practice whoever assumes the costs both in money and in time is decided politically 
through public policies that offer support when it is companies or individuals who 
decide (noting here the role of the European Social Fund in Europe). In a fair num-
ber of European countries there is an individual right to lifelong education, part of 
the costs of which are borne by the people. But the individual right to lifelong edu-
cation also receives support from businesses in many countries through the agree-
ments reached via ‘collective bargaining’ at the sector or company level. Examples 
in this field are manifold and sometimes very old (such as ‘150 Hours’ in Italy in the 
1970s, half a century ago).
The previous paragraphs imply that the central function of initial education, in a 
period of uncertainty, is to provide the instruments to access lifelong learning. It 
should be, as it has been, the basis for access to further educational activities. 
Focusing this basic function on initial education will imply making changes to the 
contents, methods and forms of this education.
We shall now make a comparison between the countries included in this study. 
As available indicators for comparability we propose the following.
Level of Education of the Adult Population (25–64 Years) Broken 
Down by Sex
Although initial school education still needs to be improved, the function of 
basic education has been and still is largely assumed, de facto, by the school system. 
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We observe that a population’s level of schooling is a good indicator of: (a) the 
danger of robotisation of jobs, which is inversely proportional to the level of educa-
tion of the workers who do them (Arntz et al. 2016); (b) people’s ability to learn new 
things through access to continuing education in any of its forms; (c) a higher edu-
cational quality of the jobs they do and (d) a greater capacity to incorporate techno-
logical change into their work (Lladós 2018). For these reasons, a country’s level of 
initial schooling is, albeit a simplification, one of the comparable indicators of its 
ability to assume the changes in the school-education system that new technologies 
will require.
With respect to the countries in the INCASI project, the comparable information 
on their level of schooling for 2010 is the following Table 5.8.
We can take this data as an indicator of the capacity or not of countries to adapt 
to technological change (the greater the schooling, the greater the capacity to adapt) 
and it reveals that overall, European countries are better placed than Latin American 
ones to deal with the technological changes we are experiencing and that are on the 
way. But among Europeans, the data suggests that Italy has lower figures for higher 
education and that out of the population as a whole, men are better positioned 
than women.
Percentage of Young People Who Do Not Reach the Level of Compulsory 
Education
Following the analysis by Arntz et al. (2016) a particularly relevant figure for com-
parison is the percentage of the population that does not reach secondary education, 
which is currently the minimum considered compulsory in all countries. Those who 
do not reach this level are those who are at the most extreme risk of doing automat-
able work and who will have the greatest difficulties readjusting to fill the new jobs 
that will appear, and hence face a significant risk of technological changes leading 
them to social exclusion.
Table 5.8 Educational attainment population from 25 to 65 years old. 2010
ES FI FR IT GB AR BR CL MX UY
Total population
Primary 30.1 28.7 19.2 19.9 15.9 41.9 37.0 22.0 34.4 48.9
Secondary 41.7 39.3 54.8 61.7 55.6 45.2 39.3 57.0 38.7 40.1
Tertiary 25.7 31.6 24.4 12.1 28.3 12.5 11.3 18.1 17.7 9.4
Female population
Primary 32.5 28.8 22.0 22.5 17.1 42.3 35.8 23.3 35.3 47.6
Secondary 39.0 36.3 51.8 56.7 54.6 43.4 39.5 55.6 37.6 39.5
Tertiary 25.2 34.4 24.7 12.5 28.1 13.0 12.5 17.9 16.5 11.2
Male population
Primary 27.6 28.6 16.2 17.5 17.1 41.6 38.1 18.7 32.8 50.1
Secondary 44.6 42.6 58.0 66.8 55.3 47.2 39.4 60.0 40.4 41.1
Tertiary 26.2 28.7 24.3 11.7 27.5 10.4 10.0 18.8 19.1 7.5
Source: Barro and Lee (2013)
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Percentage of the Active Population that Performs Continuing Education 
Activities in One Year by Age and by Previous Level of Schooling5
Taking into account the statement made in the OECD report “Adult learning can 
play an important role in helping adults to develop and maintain key information- 
processing skills, and acquire other knowledge and skills, throughout their lives. It 
is crucial to provide, and ensure access to organised learning opportunities for 
adults beyond initial formal education, especially for workers who need to adapt to 
changes throughout their careers”, another indicator of a country’s capacity to 
adapt to the impending technological and social changes is their population’s ability 
to access continuing education. The first thing we notice here is the lack of informa-
tion on access to continuing education in most Latin American countries. The 2013 
PIAAC survey only included Chile and the 2017 survey only featured Mexico, but 
the results of the latter are not yet available.
The overall data of the 2013 PIAAC survey indicates that 17% of the population 
of the OECD countries that participated in the survey aged between 25 and 64 
received either formal or non-formal education in the 12 months prior to the survey, 
although a larger proportion, 24%, would have liked to have done so. The educa-
tional activities that they had done in this period, despite being from the same 
source, were both formal and non-formal. Most of these were non-formal but 11% 
were formal, both combined with non-formal education and not. This data shows 
that adult education is gaining ground in huge proportions, albeit very differently 
between countries. From 70% in Finland, the figure drops to 25% in Italy, with 50% 
of people aged 25–65 years in countries like Spain and Chile having done educa-
tional activities. Respondents give two reasons for not having received more con-
tinuing education: (a) time (working hours and time dedicated to the family) and (b) 
cost of continuing education activities. Both factors are subject to public policies 
and funding that could facilitate access to continuing education, as is currently the 
case with the European Social Fund, although it is manifestly improvable.
As stated previously, we do not have data for most Latin American countries so 
we are unable to assess the possible differences between the INCASI project 
countries.
Educational Premium of Higher Levels
The ‘educational premium’, i.e. the increase in income depending on whether one 
reached higher education or not, is reflected in Table 5.9 in which there is no data 
for Argentina or Uruguay because they are not included in the OECD 2017 report.
This data, in addition to showing the already noted polarisation of income in 
Latin America, indicates that one of the factors of that polarisation is level of school-
ing, and more acutely than we observed in Europe. When combining the polarisa-
tion of income with that of school, we can foresee that the effects of the digital 
revolution on social exclusion are likely to be much greater in Latin American 
countries.
5 We do not have ‘finer’ comparable information on continuing education, such as the number of 
hours or the type of training.
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This data leads us to consider that the promotion of both initial and continuing 
education and both formal, non-formal and informal education should be a priority 
objective for countries in both continents, but most intensely in Latin America in 
order to exploit the benefits of technological change and avoid its negative effects.
5.4.3  Elements for Understanding the Sociocultural Change 
that Will Come with the Technological Revolution
It was previously found that the convergence of internet, mobile phones and digital 
networks was consolidated at the beginning of the decade in all the countries anal-
ysed. Would this technological convergence lead to sociocultural change? And if so, 
how? And what is its scope? Indeed, the convergence of technologies did lead to 
sociocultural change, as the analysed data reported. People adopted these technolo-
gies en masse and in doing so interpersonal ties have become digitally mediated. 
Technology users generated, it could be said, a ‘digital copy’ of their social relation-
ships on digital networks, which has led to alterations to the informal structure of 
society, corresponding to the web of social networks formed between the individu-
als that make up a society.
The alteration of the informal structure of society includes: (a) a small world 
structure6 (Milgram 1967; Watts 2006), i.e. a network with a high degree of group-
ing and the need for few random links to cover any network, no matter how large; 
(b) a reduction in the barriers of time and space, which means information is trans-
mitted much more rapidly; and (c) increased interactivity (Wolton 2000). This 
entailed a large number of social phenomena being enhanced and/or acquiring new 
force due to the alteration of that structure of society, including the reconstitution of 
6 This is an important aspect because not all networks are the same. It would be wrong to claim that 
all personal nodes are interrelated in the web, and that they therefore all communicate with each 
other. The differences in structures are associated with the phenomena that generate them. For 
example, networks with preferential links to financial phenomena. There are also regular or ordered 
network structures, disordered or random networks, small world networks, and others.
Table 5.9 Relative earnings of workers, by educational attainment (2015) (25–64 years-old with 
income from employment; upper secondary education = 100)
ES FI FR IT GB AR BR CL MX UY
Below upper secondary 71 99 80 77 76 nd 62 68 61 nd
Post-second non-terciary 114 115 nd nd Nd nd nd nd nd nd
Short-cycle tertiary nd 120 131 nd 124 nd nd 142 130 nd
Bachelor’s or equiv. nd 122 138 nd 151 nd 235 264 196 nd
Master’s, doctoral or equiv. nd 164 205 141 181 nd 449 472 371 nd
Total terciary 153 137 154 141 153 nd 249 237 202 nd
OECD Education at a glance 2017. nd no data
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social ties in the family, school and other settings due to these technologies (Winocur 
2010). Because people were able to recompose their social networks, either by re- 
forging social ties that had been lost over their lives, and/or by adding new ties 
associated with their personal interests, this process involved the creation of new 
social ties, or simply expanding those that people already had (Diani 2011). When 
digital networks made it possible to maintain a greater amount of ties, and commu-
nicate with them faster, it also became feasible to establish and maintain new social 
ties in the digital space.
The union of the technological and the social occurred through the digital media-
tion of interpersonal ties, referring to how all or part of the relationship between two 
individuals is made digitally via those technologies, offering users new capabilities 
but also producing new risks, for digital networks have been questioned due to the 
spread of intentionally false news. Likewise, digital network providers are criticised 
for the difficulty keeping data private and the filtering of information. They increas-
ingly violate so-called net neutrality, according to which all content must circulate 
freely on the internet, at the same speed and under the same conditions (Martel 
2015: 401). Similarly, people today receive a greater amount of information than in 
previous times, and so network providers have turned to algorithms, i.e. organising 
information by filtering it, such that the relative importance of information can be 
guided. To this we can add network monitoring by national governments for pur-
poses of control and repression.
At this point in the decade, this alteration means that the physical-virtual dichot-
omy no longer holds (Wellman 2001; Rheingold 2004; Pleyers 2018). As the physi-
cal network, or social network, is digitally ‘copied’ in the virtual network, people 
can use direct interaction with the physical world and/or the interactive capacity of 
the digital world as it suits them. So today, homes and workplaces are more inter-
twined than in previous times, and the link between the private and public spheres 
in which people live is also much tighter (further background in Rainie and Wellman 
2012). The local (i.e. national) sphere has been strengthened, despite what is being 
said about the consolidation of predominantly homogenised and global social rela-
tions, typical of the first wave of digital networks in the last decade. This is because 
even though the possibility of creating global links in the digital space has arisen, 
communication is mainly made with local contacts. People’s basis of collective 
action is still the communities (netdom) in which their personal lives unfold (White 
2009). Thus, “Digital issues are territorialised phenomena, the Internet does not 
abolish traditional geographic limits, does not dissolve cultural identities, nor does 
it smooth out linguistic differences: it consecrates them” (Martel 2015: 21).
As Voss and Williams (2009) noted, the decrease in state intervention in coun-
tries’ economies that reduced the protection of the population’s interests paradoxi-
cally happened at the time as an increase in civil society’s potential for organisation, 
which was reflected by the increase in social movements around the world.
In consideration that technologies link their users with a broader context, in 
which their users draw on a personal and social history that constitutes the basis 
for their use of technology (Proulx 2001: 1), it is observed that in different national 
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contexts, with very different idiosyncrasies and governments, collective actions, 
movements and social mobilisations of similar characteristics emerged, involving 
mass protests and demonstrations, and messages that spread rapidly.
2011 witnessed numerous collective protest actions in different countries, 
examples being Egypt, Tunisia, the United States (Occupy Wall Street), the 15M 
Indignados in Spain, and the protests by Chilean university students. Authors 
have particularly highlighted the mass gatherings of protesters, the vast repertoire, 
horizontality, the spread of messages across digital networks (Twitter, Facebook 
and blogs) and smartphones used by protesters, whereby they have been dubbed 
the 2.0 Revolution or the Facebook Revolution (Fuchs 2012). Castells (2015) 
claims that the horizontality of these networks favoured cooperation and eroded 
the need for formal leadership. Fuchs (2012) questions the idea of a social move-
ment without a leader, and argues that the movements that year used ICT to direct 
protesters’ actions through suggestions and instructions. Popovic (2016), writing 
on the events in Tahrir Square in 2011, stresses the importance of the work that 
Egyptian revolutionaries had been doing for years. Numerous authors include the 
use of ICT by protesters and their groups in their explanations. They have even 
suggested that they played a key role in strengthening democracy. But this is a 
controversial relationship, as was made clear by the discussion between Clay 
Shirky and Malcom Gladwell on the demonstrations in Iran in 2011 (Shirky 
2011). Shirky claimed that ICT dramatically improved the ability to share, coop-
erate and act together, which leads to a change of era. Gladwell argued that the use 
of ICTs involves a high risk because they are built on weak ties, while it is strong 
ties that support digital activism. This debate proposed the main perspectives on 
the matter, and they are still valid today.
In the following years, in different national contexts and with different social 
demands, new actors were mobilised. The Yo soy 123 student movement broke out 
in Mexico in 2012, in Brazil in 2013. More recently in Argentina in 2015, the Ni una 
menos movement in opposition to violence against women broke out, followed in 
2018 by the social movement around the proposed voluntary interruption of preg-
nancy bill. In the same year, France had its ‘yellow vests movement’ (mouvement 
des gilets jaunes). And in 2019 there were other social movements7 in Ecuador over 
oil and in Peru over corruption, while Spain had the Catalan independence ‘pro-
cess’. As we write this chapter, there are mass protests in Chile8 against the increased 
cost of public transport in the capital city. This example includes all the illustrative 
characteristics of digital mediation in interpersonal ties, whereby it is mainly self- 
convened, involves massive social participation; and demonstrations in many differ-
ent places at the same time. It is decentralised, yet it is presented to the public in a 
coordinated manner, even though it may sometimes appear to be out of control. And 
7 https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/10/26/america/1572112346_368643.html
8 https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/2019/10/26/sin-escenarios-ni-locutor-ni-discursos-el-pueblo- 
le-dio-un-mandato-a-la-politica/
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all this is happening in the face of perplexity among public authorities, and is put-
ting traditional social intermediaries in a very difficult situation.
In sum, the implications of the ongoing changes mean that technological con-
vergence has led to major socio-technological change as people adopt the internet, 
smartphones and digital networks en masse. In doing so, they digitally mediate 
interpersonal ties, thereby altering the informal structure of a society that acts as 
a support for various social phenomena by introducing new elements and new 
dynamics that require something other than traditional social intermediaries 
(political parties, unions, neighbourhood organisations, student bodies, etc.) who 
have usually only viewed these technologies as a means of communication. But 
they actually constitute the most efficient, most robust and fastest means to dis-
seminate information, ideas and influence by digital word of mouth, and grant the 
possibility to generate ‘bottom-up’ collective actions due to the preponderance of 
the local within the web through which messages are transmitted and retransmit-
ted, i.e. information is transferred from one individual to another inside the net-
work. How does this happen? In order for a message to be retransmitted, it must 
mean something to the person who transmits it, and also to their ‘friends’ in the 
network who receive it. If this happens to ‘friends’ and to ‘friends of friends’ then 
the message will soon be passed all around the network due to the structural char-
acteristics of the ‘small world’.
5.5  Conclusions
In the society that has been emerging over the last 10–15 years, the digital economy 
has become increasingly more hegemonic in terms of business activities and organ-
isation, jobs and, little by little, people’s everyday lives. It will not advance at the 
same rate in all countries and the whole of society will not be covered. That is why 
comparisons between countries make sense, as we have done in this chapter, as well 
as examining differences between men and women, educational differences and 
others. But digital technologies are developed in a specific social context, so inter-
ests, strategies, associations, and cultural, social and political traditions will play a 
role in their evolution. We have sought to summarise all these possible conditions 
for the advance of new technologies and their consequences for the people in terms 
of what we have called policies (regulations, public resources, government actions, 
strategies of social actors, as well as the role of both formal and informal educa-
tion). But we have also examined some of the real everyday practices of the people.
The Advancement of Technological Innovation and Its Consequences
We first looked at companies and employment. The data indicates that internet con-
nection has grown very substantially in all countries. However, small and medium 
enterprises still make less use of its possibilities for purchases, sales, accountancy 
and organisation, and many workers have limited STEM (Science, Technology, 
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Engineering and Mathematics) skills. The issue of STEM, which is viewed as a 
need for everyone and as an indicator of the skills that everyone will need in the 
future, is not at all clear for non-technological occupations, which will be the major-
ity of those that will be created using the economic surplus. This certainly raises the 
risk of routine jobs that are substitutable by technology, if the cost of the substitute 
technology is lower than the cost of human labour. In addition, technological inno-
vation is not synonymous with good salaries and conditions, the case of ‘riders’ 
being a good example. The history of technological innovations, especially in the 
most recent years, does not suggest that we need to fear an ostensible loss of jobs, 
but there may well be a sharp downturn in their quality, even in the most developed 
countries, and they will undergo remarkable transformation. Digitalisation will be 
responsible for the latter aspect, and globalisation for the former, as it involves com-
peting with the whole planet and very different working conditions. And this is what 
is going to happen unless there are regional, national and even global policies to 
prevent it.
As for everyday life, increased use of the internet and smartphones means big 
changes in communications, relationships, leisure, shopping habits and so on, and 
spectacular growth has been recorded in all countries from 2005 onwards. However, 
there are differences between Latin American and European countries, with the lat-
ter at an advantage with two exceptions, namely Chile, which is considerably ahead 
of other Latin American countries, and Italy, which is below the European average. 
There has also been a spectacular increase in the use of social networks, again with 
differences between the two blocks of countries, especially for Twitter. But it should 
be noted that progress here is ambivalent, for although the radius of relationships 
can dramatically increase, these can be highly superficial. People are able to com-
municate their thoughts to many more other people, but we are also being exposed 
to fake news, deception and identity theft.
In the field of education and training, we should highlight the importance of a 
high level of education in the face of advances in digital technologies. The differ-
ences between countries are notable, not only between the two analysed blocks, but 
also within each block. It is also beyond doubt that lifelong learning will become 
more and more important in the coming years, due to changes to employment.
Society’s Possible and Desirable Responses
Improved labour conditions in the digital economy will at least depend on the fol-
lowing factors: modernisation of the productive structure, which requires invest-
ment in R&D&I; a shift towards renewable energies, which will help to face another 
huge challenge, the climate crisis; and new regulations on employment, taxation 
and support for unemployment. The State must play a key role here. Experts say 
that, and so do the European Commission and the OECD. Latin American countries 
are trailing behind Europe in R&D&I, but not always in renewable energy. 
Difficulties with regulation (see the informal employment indicator) are a tradi-
tional barrier among Latin American countries.
New demands for training will require negotiation between stakeholders, and 
also for the state to foster the right for everyone to be properly trained from 
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childhood to retirement. This is an essential issue in order to keep pace with techno-
logical change without serious problems being caused in the workplace. The digital 
revolution is a risk to jobs, both in terms of quantity and quality, but this risk can 
become an opportunity if society is able to foster the modernisation of the produc-
tive structure and training, and especially the continuing education of the workforce.
As for the new panorama for everyday life, the digital revolution opens up many 
opportunities in terms of communication, relationships, collective action, leisure, 
consumption, culture, etc. Society must prevent the digital divide from affecting 
social groups or regions. But beyond this, the public authorities must regulate, mon-
itor and guarantee the privacy of people’s data and ensure that nobody suffers abuse 
or is manipulated by the superpower platforms.
The digital revolution may increase and consolidate the biggest social inequali-
ties in the world. But there is also a very real possibility that they can be reduced 
with the right tax, labour and investment policies, which should necessarily be 
global, and here lies one of the problems. Finally, the digital revolution also raises 
the hope of curbing the climate crisis, our most important challenge of all right now. 
But it might also make the crisis worse. Whatever the result, it will depend on social 
movements, social organisations and the people’s attitudes, as well as real political 
will on the part of every country in the world.
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